On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign
registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co.,
allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored
at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before
the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8
July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as
additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai
Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss
which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24
January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the
case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February
2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the
sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping
Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the
assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records
petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D",
"E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J"
and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P"
and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S"
and its sub-markings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the
motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows
that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of
the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the
originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original
of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to
Defendant Wallem Philippines’ Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly
pointed out in defendant Wallem’s Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox
copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision
dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is correct in contending that the
photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Held:
Petition denied.
The Court held that in order to shed light to the issue of
whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated
in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall
enumerate the following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to
wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of
estimated cost of damages of petitioner’s power barges 207 and 209 prepared by
Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine
Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in
his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten,
and manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of
the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner which was manually
signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter
containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by Mr. Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten
notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual typewriter, signed manually
by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was
received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the
electricity supply and operation and maintenance agreement between petitioner
and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page containing three
unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of
Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed
by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it
was received. The sub-markings also contain manual
signatures and/or handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of
termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and manually signed
by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document
marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident
report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and by the Notary Public,
with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter
manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public, together with other
handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers
to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which
a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an
electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic
document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a
paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed;
clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such
as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic
documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared
that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent
of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and
its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings,
"K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N"
and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings,
"Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was
correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule
and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before
the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic
copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or
fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of
the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in
the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal
relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns
addressed by the best evidence rule.
_______________________________
Full text of the case available at: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/april2007/170491.htm
No comments:
Post a Comment